<?php

use Illuminate\Foundation\Application;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Configuration\Exceptions;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Configuration\Middleware;
use Illuminate\Http\Request;

return Application::configure(basePath: dirname(__DIR__))
    ->withRouting(
        web: __DIR__.'/../routes/web.php',
        commands: __DIR__.'/../routes/console.php',
        health: '/up',
    )
    ->withMiddleware(function (Middleware $middleware) {
        // '*' is deliberate. The container is only reachable through Traefik
        // (no published port in Dokploy), and nginx's real_ip module has
        // already rewritten REMOTE_ADDR to the client's address. Restricting
        // this to private ranges would therefore stop Laravel from honouring
        // the X-Forwarded-Proto that nginx sets server-side, and every signed
        // URL and secure cookie would break behind HTTPS.
        //
        // X_FORWARDED_HOST is deliberately excluded. Trusting it lets a client
        // set an arbitrary Host and have route()/url() emit links pointing at
        // an attacker's domain — including the public assignment PDF links,
        // which carry a valid access code.
        $middleware->trustProxies(
            at: '*',
            headers: Request::HEADER_X_FORWARDED_FOR
                | Request::HEADER_X_FORWARDED_PORT
                | Request::HEADER_X_FORWARDED_PROTO
        );

        // Second line of defence: only serve requests whose Host matches
        // APP_URL. Relaxed outside production so local access by IP works.
        $middleware->trustHosts(at: function () {
            $host = parse_url((string) config('app.url'), PHP_URL_HOST);

            // localhost/127.0.0.1 are kept for container-internal probes: the
            // Docker health check and Dokploy's own checks address the
            // container directly, not through the public domain. They are not
            // an external hole — Traefik only forwards requests whose Host
            // matches a configured domain.
            return array_values(array_filter([$host, 'localhost', '127.0.0.1']));
        }, subdomains: false);

        // Dopo il ripristino di un backup ogni account resta bloccato finche'
        // non imposta una password nuova. In coda al gruppo web, quindi la
        // sessione e' gia' avviata e l'utente risolto quando gira.
        //
        // AuthenticateSession prima: ogni sessione ricorda l'impronta della
        // password, e quando la password cambia (profilo, cambio obbligatorio,
        // l'amministratore che la reimposta) le sessioni aperte altrove si
        // chiudono alla richiesta successiva. Quella che ha fatto il cambio
        // resta aperta: il middleware ci registra l'impronta nuova. Senza,
        // session()->regenerate() cambiava solo l'id della sessione corrente e
        // le altre restavano valide su Redis.
        $middleware->web(append: [
            \Illuminate\Session\Middleware\AuthenticateSession::class,
            \App\Http\Middleware\RequirePasswordChange::class,
        ]);

        $middleware->alias([
            'role' => \Spatie\Permission\Middleware\RoleMiddleware::class,
            'permission' => \Spatie\Permission\Middleware\PermissionMiddleware::class,
            'role_or_permission' => \Spatie\Permission\Middleware\RoleOrPermissionMiddleware::class,
        ]);
    })
    ->withExceptions(function (Exceptions $exceptions) {
        //
    })->create();